

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 031432
ORIGIN ACDA-02

INFO OCT-01 IO-01 ISO-00 EUR-01 /005 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:NWALDROP

APPROVED BY: ACDA/IR:WSTEARNMAN

EUR/RPM:JHAWES

-----110713Z 003720 /15

R 110448Z FEB 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 031432

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE, SECDEF FROM NATO FEB 03:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 0607

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO PARM

SUBJECT: THE US ARMS CONTROL AGENDA AND NATO

REF: A. STATE 15870 250004Z JAN 77 NOTAL

B. USNATO 390 DTG 241723Z JAN 77

C. USNATO 302 191745Z JAN 77

D. USNATO 285 191537Z JAN 77 NOTAL

E. USNATO 164 131545Z JAN 77 NOTAL

F. 76 PARIS 37823 231224Z DEC 76 NOTAL

G. PARIS 3361 021825Z FEB 77 NOTAL

SUMMARY: THE RENEWED EMPHASIS BY THE PRESIDENT ON ARMS CONTROL HAS STIMULATED ALLIED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE US INITIATIVES. SOME ALLIES HAVE STATED THAT NATO SHOULD APPEAR PUBLICLY TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. THUS, THE DANISH SUGGESTIONS (REFS C AND D), ENDORSED BY SOME ALLIES AT THE NAC MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE (REF B), POINT TOWARD CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 031432

SUSTAINED, HIGHER-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AT NATO; POSSIBLE FRESH NATO PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD; AND THE EXPECTATION OF SUBSTANTIAL US CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON ARMS CONTROL. AS WASHINGTON PROCEEDS WITH ITS STUDIES OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL, AS WELL, TO CONSIDER (A) HOW NATO CONSULTATIONS COULD ASSIST IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF US OBJECTIVES, AND (B) THE RELEVANCE OF ALLIED EFFORTS IN THIS AREA TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO IN PARTICULAR, AND TO THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF ARMS CONTROL POSTURES WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE AND IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN

GENERAL. BELOW, WE SUGGEST SOME ANALYSES OF THESE ISSUES AND SKETCH OUT THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES THAT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AT NATO -- SHOULD WASHINGTON DECIDE THAT INCREASED ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITY HERE WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST. WHILE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS WILL BE IMPORTANT IN ASSURING CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR US POLICIES, OTHER OPTIONS FOR SIGNIFICANT INCREASED NATO ACTIVITY IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL ASSESSMENT. OUR CENTRAL PURPOSE AT NATO, WE RECOGNIZE, IS TO ENHANCE ALLIED SECURITY IN THE BROADEST SENSE. WE WOULD NOT WISH ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS TO DETRACT -- AS INDEED THEY NEED NOT -- FROM THIS MISSION'S EFFORTS ON BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

END SUMMARY.

1. THE DANISH PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS PROMPTED THE DANISH SUGGESTIONS, AND THEIR ENDORSEMENT BY SEVERAL ALLIES, FOR INCREASED CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT NATO WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING PROPOSALS THAT WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE PUBLIC IMPACT:

(A) THE DESIRE OF SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO APPEAR VIGOROUS IN SEEKING LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS ON ARMAMENTS -- A DESIRE EVIDENCED PARTICULARLY BY THE DANES, NORWEGIANS, AND DUTCH, BUT SHARED TO SOME DEGREE BY THE UK, FRG, AND ITALY.

(B) A DESIRE TO GIVE NATO A MORE POSITIVE PUBLIC IMAGE -- A SUGGESTION PROMPTED BY THE CONCERN THAT A CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 031432

SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC TENDS TO ASSOCIATE NATO WITH "MILITARISTIC" ACTIVITIES. ON THE LEFT OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRIVE THIS NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION HOME HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS OVER THE YEARS.

(C) A BELIEF THAT TOO OFTEN THE WEST HAS HAD TO REACT DEFENSIVELY TO SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY AT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLIES, AND THAT, THROUGH ADDITIONAL EFFORT, THE WEST, AND NATO, MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO BETTER IN THIS AREA.

2. US INITIATIVES AND THE ALLIES. THE EMPHASIS THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS ACCORDING TO ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES HAS ALREADY BEEN WIDELY WELCOMED AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST TO US IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS, AS INDEED THE DANES DID IN THEIR PAPER (REF C). THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD US THAT THEY HAVE REPORTED TO LONDON THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AND THE DANISH PROPOSALS POINT TOWARD GREATER EMPHASIS AT NATO ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES; AND THE BRITISH ADDED THAT THEY WILL BE LOOKING TO US TO TAKE THE LEAD. THE ALLIES UNDERSTAND, TOO, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TO REGAIN THE WEST'S INITIATIVE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

3. THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS ONLY BEGINNING ITS STUDIES OF THESE ISSUES AND THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME BEFORE THE NATO ALLIES CAN BE INFORMED ABOUT POSSIBLE US INITIATIVES. AT THE SAME TIME, WHILE PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS MAY PROMPT MIXED FEELINGS AMONG SOME ALLIED OFFICIALS, WE BELIEVE GENERAL ALLIED SUPPORT CAN BE MUSTERED FOR NEW AND VIGOROUS DISARMEAMENT EFFORTS IF THEY ARE SEEN AS SERVING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AND AS RESPONSIVE TO THE DESIRE OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO GAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, WITHOUT SACRIFICING SECURITY.

PAGE 04 STATE 031432

ITY. MOREOVER, ALLIED SUPPORT FOR FRESH US INITIATIVES CAN BE ENHANCED BY CONSULTING THE ALLIES AT APPROPRIATE STAGES AND BY MAKING THEM FEEL THEY ARE BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANY EVIDENCE OF OVERRIDING US-SOVIET BILATERALISM COULD SOUR THE PROSPECTS FOR A POSITIVE ALLIED RESPONSE TO US INITIATIVES -- AS THE FRG PERMREP MADE CLEAR IN THE NAC'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE. POLITICALLY, WE WOULD UNDERLINE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THAT POSITIVE PUBLIC FEEDBACK FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SERIOUS PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL SHOULD ACCRUE ALSO TO THE ALLIES AND NOT ONLY TO WASHINGTON.

4. OPTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL NATO ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. AS WE INDICATED IN REF E, A RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AT NATO IN RESPONSE TO THE DANISH PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE PUT FORWARD AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF (A) REGULAR NAC-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON SALT AND MBFR AND (B) LITTLE SUSTAINED NATO ATTENTION IN RECENT YEARS TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, ASIDE FROM THOSE ADDRESSED IN THE SEMI-ANNUAL EXPERTS MEETINGS. THIS RANGE COULD INCLUDE:

(A) AFTER FURTHER PERMREPS' DISCUSSION, REMANDING THE DANISH PROPOSALS TO A STANDING BODY, SUCH AS THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THIS PROCEDURAL STEP WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF ESTABLISHING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AS A REGULAR SPC AGENDA ITEM WITHOUT EMBARRASSING THE FRENCH OR PREJUDICING THE OUTCOME OF COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THIS SUBJECT. IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLIES TO FURTHER DISCUSS THE DANISH IDEAS, TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AS A MATTER OF REGULAR BUSINESS AND, GRADUALLY, TO CHART FOLLOW-UP WORK.

(B) DISCUSSION OF GENERAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE NAC. NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS' REPORTS MIGHT BE PLACED ON THE COUNCIL'S AGENDA (THEY HAVE NOT BEEN IN THE PAST) TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 031432

ANNUAL DISCUSSION. THE COUNCIL MIGHT ALSO, AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE, UNDERTAKE A BROADER REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT MATTERS WITH OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, AS WE SUGGESTED IN REF D. FINALLY, WE NOTE THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE PRACTICE, WHICH OBTAINED THROUGH MOST OF THE SIXTIES AND BEYOND, OF HAVING ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE CCD AT GENEVA COME OCCASIONALLY TO NATO TO BRIEF THE NAC AND DISCUSS CURRENT MULTINATIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

5. IN OUTLINING THESE POSSIBILITIES, WE HAVE IN MIND THAT NATO PROVIDES ONLY ONE POSSIBLE FORUM FOR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES -- AND THAT IT MAY NOT BE THE BEST ONE FOR SOME SUBJECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AS EMBASSY PARIS SUGGESTED (REF F), THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS MIGHT BE EXPLORED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AS NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY HAS BEEN PURSUED THROUGH THE CLUB OF LONDON. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, FEW TOPICS THAT CANNOT ALSO BE DISCUSSED IN NATO, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE WANT TO INFORM OUR ALLIES OF DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO ALLIED SECURITY. WE RECOGNIZE, AS WELL, THAT ADDITIONAL EFFORTS SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON MBFR AND SALT.

6. US CONTRIBUTIONS. WHILE WASHINGTON WILL WISH TO DECIDE WHICH ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN NATO, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE US WOULD BE WELCOMED:

(A) ON POSSIBLE INITIATIVES AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN US POLICY THE ALLIES COULD BE BRIEFED AT THE SEMI-ANNUAL DISARMAMENT EXPERTS' MEETINGS, OF WHICH THE NEXT IS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 21-22. BUT WE SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT, AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST, TO THE NEED TO PROVIDE BRIEFING PAPERS AND TIMELY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON US PLANS AND US REACTIONS TO SOVIET MOVES.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 031432

(B) WHEN WE TAKE STEPS AT THE CCD REGARDING JOINT TIVES WITH THE SOVIETS OR EXPERTS' GROUPS WE COULD UOL THESE MOVES AS OPPORTUNITIES TO AGAIN DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO CONSULTATIONS -- AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID THE RUSH THAT INEVITABLY TAKES PLACE WHEN ISSUES ARE PRESSED TO RAPID DECISION IN WASHINGTON TO MEET LAST-MINUTE NEGOTIATING DEADLINES THAT LEAVE LITTLE TIME TO INFORM ALLIES AT NATO.

(C) ON INTERNAL US GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, SUCH AS POSSIBLE SUBMISSION OF THE TTBT AND THE PNE TREATY TO THE CONGRESS, A BRIEF NOTICE TO THE COUNCIL, WHICH WE COULD CIRCULATE BY LETTER OF MENTION AT PERMREPS LUNCHES

OR IN THE NAC, WOULD BE USEFUL.

(D) SOME ANALYTICAL PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES PREPARED WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR CIRCULATION TO THE ALLIES. AS ONE EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THE EXCELLENT INR PAPER ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NON-USE PROPOSALS (NO 162 OF OCTOBER 18, 1975) WHICH, WE ARE SURE, THE DANES WOULD FIND RESPONSIVE TO THEIR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FROM THE US.

7. POSSIBLE RESULTS OF NATO ACTIVITIES. THE FRENCH, WE ASSUME, WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT JOINT NATO ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY IF THEY CONSTITUTED A SWEEPING PROGRAM. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO THWART, HOWEVER. MOREOVER, WE MIGHT ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE RESULTS BEYOND ONLY INTERNAL NATO DISCUSSIONS:

(A) INCREASED EMPHASIS IN MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. A NUMBER OF ALLIES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE DECEMBER 1976 COMMUNIQUE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS, CONTAINED A PASSAGE ON ALLIED DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES. A SIMILAR PASSAGE, PERHAPS EXPANDED, MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE LONDON COMMUNIQUE IN MAY, AND PERHAPS EVEN BECOME A REGULAR FEATURE OF NATO COMMUNIQUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 031432

(B) A NATO STATEMENT ON GENERAL ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE ISSUED SEPARATELY FROM THE COMMUNIQUE. EVEN IF SUCH A STATEMENT WERE COINED IN GENERAL TERMS, IT MIGHT GO FAR TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE DANISH PAPER.

(C) A LIST OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS THAT THE ALLIES WISHED TO EXPLORE MIGHT ALSO BE PUT FORWARD IF AN ACCEPTABLE MODE FOR DOING SO COULD BE FOUND. MAKING PUBLIC SUCH A LIST ON AN ALLIED BASIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN THE FACE OF FRENCH RESISTANCE, HOWEVER, AS WE DESCRIBE BELOW.

8. THE FRENCH PROBLEM. WE AGREE FULLY WITH EMBASSY PARIS THAT THE FRENCH PROBABLY WILL RESIST STRONGLY EFFORTS TO EXPAND ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION IN NATO, PARTICULARLY ON NON-TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (REF G). IF THEY PROVE INTRANSIGENT, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF NATO'S CONSENSUS RULE, FOR THE US, OR OTHER ALLIES, TO PROCEED WITH EXPANDED DISCUSSIONS IN NATO. HOWEVER, IF THE US WISHES TO PROCEED WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK WITH SUCH DISCUSSIONS, WE SUGGEST THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A VERY HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH TO THE FRENCH. THE DEMARCHE COULD (A) AFFIRM THE US INTEREST IN UTILIZING NATO AS A FORUM FOR CONSULTATIONS ON SOME ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, (B) RECALL THAT ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS LONG HAVE BEEN A

FIXTURE ON NATO'S AGENDA, AND (C) URGE A NON-OBSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY FRANCE. ONLY SUCH AN APPROACH, IN OUR VIEW, WILL OVERCOME THE EFLEX FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO EXPANDING CONSULTATIONS IN NATO BEYOND MATTERS OF A STRICTLY EAST-WEST CHARACTER. WE AR E NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER A STRAIGHT-FROM-THE-SHOULDER APPROACH TO THE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD IMPACT ADVERSELY ON OTHER ISSUES IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT,UNLESS NUDGED WITH SOME VIGOR, FRANCE WILLNOT BEGIN TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 031432

POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN NATO OF THE KIND THAT WILL BE NEEDED IF ALLIANCE FORA ARE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PURPOSES.

9. THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT. THE IMPACT OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ON THE POLITICAL SCENE IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE INTERPLAY OF SOVIET "PEACE" EFFORTS AND ALLIED SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES IS, IN OUR VIEW, A FIELD THAT DESERVES CAREFUL ANALYSIS BY THE US. WHILE THE RESULTS MAY NOT BE USEFUL DIRECTLY IN NATO, THESE ANALYSES COULD HELP GUIDE US POLICIES. THE ARMS CONTROL GAME, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED, IS POLITICAL IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND GOES TO THE HEART OF WHO SUPPORTS THE EAST AND WHO SUPPORTS THE WEST ON CURUCIAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE BALNACE OF POWER IN EUROPE. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US AT NATO TO ASSESS THE FULL IMPACT OF THE SOVIET "PEACE" PROGRAM, THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGEST TO US LINES FOR FURTHER US ANALYSIS:

(A) HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE THE SOVIETS BEENIN UNDER-MINING THE WESTERNIMAGE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND IN MAINTAINING PRESSURE AND TENSION ON ALLIED POSITIONS? SHOULD THE ALLIES COUNTER MORE VIGOROUSLY SOVIET PRO-PAGANDA INITIATIVES SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET PRO-FESSIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT BILATERALLY -- BUT ONLY AFTER SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE LAUNCHED, AND THEN WITH THE AIMNOT OF DISCUSSING SUBSTANCE BUT OF DIVIDING THE ALLIES?

(B) WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE TO NATO OF POSITIONS ADOPTED BY WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES ON ISSUES CENTRAL TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE? AT THE SPRING 1976 ECPC IN BERLIN, WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, DESPITE PROTESTATIONS OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, SUBSECRIBED TO STANDARD SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, INCLUDING SOME THAT WOULD CRIPPLE NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE. (IN REACTING TO THE NOVEMBER WARSAW PACT BUCHAREST DECLARATION, WE UNDER- STAND THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS ENDORSED SOVIET PROPOSALS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 031432

ON NON-FIRST-USE AND NON-ENLARGEMENT OF NATO AND THE WP,
WHILE THE ITALIANS REMAINED SILENT.) WHAT ARE THE IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THESE POSITIONS IF COMMUNIST
PARTIES CAME TO SHARE POWER? IS IT POSSIBLE OR
DESIRABLE, AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED, TO CONFRONT THEM
PUBLICLY ON CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS WHETHER THEY SUPPORT
WESTERN NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES IN MBFR?

9. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN ARMS
CONTROL POSTURES SHOULD DRIVE THE
FORMULATION OF US POSITIONS OR THAT INCREASED US SENSI-
TIVITY TO SUCH ISSUES SHOULD PROMOTE EAST-WEST POLEMICS
OR DEFLECT THE CONTINUED PURSUIT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.
WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT FURTHER US ANALYSIS COULD
HELP IDENTIFY THE RELEVANCE OF SOVIET AND US ARMS CON-
TROL POSTURES TO POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE OBJEC-
TIVES AND POSSIBLY SUGGEST DIFFERENT TACTICS FOR THE
UNITED STATES --AND ULTIMATELY THE ALLIES -- IN DEALING
WITH SOVIET "PEACE" INITIATIVES IN THE ARMS CONTROL
FIELD. STRAUSS-HUPE UNQUOTE VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 11-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE031432
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/IR:NWALDROP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770049-0396
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197702100/baaaevgc.tel
Line Count: 348
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 284d1fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. STATE 15870 250004Z JAN 77 NOTAL B. USNATO 390 DTG 241723Z JAN 77 C. USNATO 302 191745Z JAN 77 D. USNATO 285 191537Z JAN 77 NOTAL E. USNATO 164 131545Z JAN 77 NOTAL F. 76 PARIS 37823 231224Z DEC 76 NOTAL
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29-Sep-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3233691
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE US ARMS CONTROL AGENDA AND NATO
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbcr//SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/284d1fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009